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Abstract
The information provided by global positioning
systems is never totally exact, and there are al-
ways errors when measuring position and veloc-
ity of moving objects such as aircraft. This pa-
per studies the effects of these errors in the ac-
tual separation of aircraft in the context of state-
based conflict detection and resolution. Assum-
ing that the state information is uncertain but that
bounds on the errors are known, this paper pro-
vides an analytical definition of a safety buffer
and sufficient conditions under which this buffer
guarantees that actual conflicts are detected and
solved. The results are presented as theorems,
which were formally proven using a mechanical
theorem prover.
1 Introduction
Advances in global positioning systems and com-
munication technology have enabled new air traf-
fic management concepts where the responsibil-
ity for separation is air/ground distributed. One
of such concepts is state-based conflict detec-
tion and resolution (CD&R), a tactical approach
for probing and solving air traffic conflicts that
only relies on the state information, i.e., the cur-
rent position and velocity vectors of the aircraft.
Over the last years, several algorithms for state-
based CD&R have been proposed [1, 3, 5, 8, 11].
Given the critical role that these systems play
in the airspace system, some of these algorithms
and concepts [7, 10, 11] have been formally ana-
lyzed for safety properties such as independence,
i.e., minimum separation is guaranteed when one
of the aircraft maneuvers, and implicit coordi-
nation, i.e., minimum separation is guaranteed
when both aircraft maneuver with no explicit co-
ordination between them [4]. In general, the ver-
ification that a given algorithm satisfies theses
safety properties assume that the aircraft state in-
formation is accurately known.
The position provided by global navigation
satellite systems like GPS is accurate up to a few
meters (about 10m).1 Errors in position and ve-
locity data negatively affect the minimum sepa-
ration guaranteed by CD&R systems. Therefore,
when CD&R algorithms are used in practice, a
safety buffer is added to the minimum separation
to accommodate for the imprecision in the state
information. The size of the safety buffers is usu-
ally determined by experimentation and simula-
tion.
This paper presents a formal analysis of the
effects of errors in position and velocity informa-
tion of pairwise state-based CD&R algorithms.
Under the assumption that the bounds of position
and velocity errors in the state information of the
ownship and traffic aircraft are known, this paper
rigorously provides answers to questions such as
(a) what is the actual minimum separation de-
tected by a CD&R algorithm that assumes per-
1See http://www.kowoma.de/en/gps/
errors.htm.
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fect information? and (b) how large has to be the
safety buffer to guarantee a given minimum sep-
aration when the conflict is resolved by a CD&R
algorithm that assumes perfect information? The
mathematical development presented in this pa-
per, including formal proofs of all lemmas and
theorems,2 has been mechanically checked using
the interactive theorem prover PVS (Prototype
Verification System) [12], a higher-order logic
based theorem prover developed by SRI Interna-
tional.3 For readability, this paper uses standard
mathematical notation instead of PVS syntax.
2 Basic Definitions
As typical of pairwise state-based CD&R ap-
proaches, a 2-dimensional airspace is considered
with two distinguished aircraft: the ownship and
the intruder aircraft, which represents a traffic
aircraft. Moreover, aircraft dynamics are repre-
sented by a point moving at constant linear speed
in a 2-dimensional Euclidean space.
2.1 Error Bounds
The ownship’s and intruder’s actual positions are
denoted by the vectors so = (sox,soy) and si =
(six,siy), respectively. The ownship’s and in-
truder’s actual velocity vectors are denoted by
vo = (vox,voy) and vi = (vix,viy), respectively.
Since the actual vectors are unknown to CD&R
algorithms, this paper also considers the mea-
sured position and velocity vectors of each air-
craft, which are denoted smo = (smox,smoy) and vmo =
(vmox,v
m
oy), respectively, for the ownship; and smi =
(smix,s
m
iy) and vi = (v
m
ix,v
m
iy), respectively, for the
intruder aircraft. Bounds on the position and ve-
locity errors are assumed to be known, i.e.,
2For technical details on the proofs of the proper-
ties enounced in this paper, the reader is referred to
the PVS development available at http://shemesh.
larc.nasa.gov/people/cam/ACCoRD.
3PVS is electronically available at http://pvs.
csl.sri.com.
||so− smo || ≤ εso, (1)
||si− smi || ≤ εsi, (2)
|track(vo)− track(vmo )| ≤ εαo, (3)
|||vo||− ||vmo ||| ≤ εgo, (4)
|track(vi)− track(vmi )| ≤ εαi, (5)
|||vi||− ||vmi ||| ≤ εgi, (6)
where εso and εsi are strictly positive constants
that denote the position error bounds for the
ownship and intruder aircraft, respectively; εαo
and εαi are strictly positive constants that denote
the track error bounds for the ownship and in-
truder aircraft, respectively; and εgo and εgi are
strictly positive constants that denote the ground
speed error bounds for the ownship and intruder
aircraft, respectively. Furthermore, given a 2-
dimensional vector u, the expression ||u|| denotes
the norm of u, i.e.,
||u|| ≡
√
ux2 +uy2,
and track(u) denotes the track angle of u, i.e., the
angle α measured clockwise from the North that
satisfies
u = (||u||sinα, ||u||cosα).
Since εαo, εαi, εgo and εgi are measure er-
rors, they are small compared to the measured
values. Therefore, the following inequalities are
assumed.
εαo ≤ pi2 ,
εgo ≤ ||vmo || ,
||vmo ||(1− cosεαo)≤ εgo.
(7)
εαi ≤ pi2 ,
εgi ≤ ||vmi || ,
||vmi ||(1− cosεαi)≤ εgi.
(8)
2.2 Aircraft Separation
In a 2-dimensional airspace, the separation crite-
rion for two aircraft is specified as a minimum
2
Formal Verification of Safety Buffers for Sate-Based Conflict Detection and Resolution
horizontal separation D. A conflict between the
ownship and the intruder occurs when there is a
time within a lookahead time T such that the dis-
tance between the aircraft is less than D. Typi-
cally D is 5 nautical miles and T is 5 minutes.
Formally, the ownship and the intruder aircraft
are in conflict if there exists 0 ≤ t ≤ T such that
at time t the following inequality holds
‖(so + t vo)− (si + t vi)‖< D.
Since (so + t vo)− (si + t vi) = (so − si) +
t (vo− vi), the predicate that characterizes con-
flict can be defined on s = so− si and v = vo−vi,
i.e., the relative position and velocity vector, re-
spectively, of the ownship with respect to the in-
truder. That is, conflict can be viewed as a predi-
cate on two vectors s and v rather than a predicate
on four vectors so, vo, si, and vi. Thus, the predi-
cate conflict? is defined as follows.
conflict?(D,T,s,v)≡
∃ 0≤ t ≤ T : ||s+ t v||< D. (9)
Since it greatly simplifies the notation, posi-
tion and velocity will usually be given in the rel-
ative framework where the intruder is fix at the
origin of the coordinate system and the ownship
is moving relative to the intruder. In this rela-
tive view, sm and vm will denote the measured
relative position and velocity vectors smo −smi and
vmo −vmi , respectively.
Graphically, the separation criterion can be
understood as an imaginary circular area of diam-
eter D around each aircraft and a conflict between
two aircraft as a predicted overlapping of these
areas. In the alternative but equivalent relative
view, only the intruder is surrounded by a circle,
called the protected zone, of radius D. From this
perspective, a conflict between these two aircraft
is equivalent to the existence of a time 0≤ t ≤ T
at which the ownship is in the interior of the in-
truder’s protected zone. For example in the left
side of Figure 1, the upper point represents the
ownship with its velocity vector and its avoid-
ance area (circle of diameter D around the air-
craft). The lower point represents the traffic air-
craft. The right side represents the same infor-
mation in the translated coordinate system. The
s
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Fig. 1 Translated Coordinate System
two aircraft are potentially in conflict because the
half-line defined by the relative velocity vector v
intersects the protected area around the traffic air-
craft.
2.3 Conflict Detection and Resolution Algo-
rithms
A conflict detection algorithm cd is a function
that takes as parameters D, T , and the measured
position and velocity vectors of the aircraft, i.e.,
smo , vmo , smi , v
m
i . It returns a Boolean value such
that CD(D,T,smo ,vmo ,smi ,v
m
i ) = true if and only
if
conflict?(D,T,smo − smi ,vmo −vmi ),
i.e., it returns true if there is a conflict assuming
perfect state information.
A conflict resolution algorithm cr is a func-
tion that takes as parameters D, T , and the mea-
sured position and velocity vectors of the aircraft,
i.e., smo , vmo , smi , v
m
i . It returns a set of velocity
vectors wmo that, if implemented by the ownship
in zero time, solves any impending conflict as-
suming perfect state information, i.e.,
¬conflict?(D,T,smo − smi ,wmo −vmi ).
In this paper, these algorithms are abstract,
i.e., no particular implementation of cd and
cr are considered. In other words, the results
that have been obtained hold for any state-based
CD&R algorithm that correctly implement the
specifications above such as those in KB3D [3]
and NASA’s ACCoRD [11].
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This paper provides the mathematical defini-
tion of a safety buffer ψ that satisfies the follow-
ing properties:
1. cd(D+ψ,T,smo ,vmo ,smi ,v
m
i ) = false im-
plies
¬conflict?(D,T,so− si,vo−vi).
2. wmo ∈ cr(D+ψ,T,smo ,vmo ,smi ,vmi ) implies
¬conflict?(D,T,so− si,wmo −vi).
The first property states that a conflict detection
algorithm that uses a protected zone extended
by ψ has no missed-alerts. The second prop-
erty states that a conflict resolution algorithm that
uses a protected zone extended by ψ returns res-
olution maneuvers that guarantee an actual min-
imum separation D. The safety buffer ψ is an
upper bound on the error in the minimum sepa-
ration incurred by CD&R algorithms that assume
precise aircraft state information.
3 Relative Position and Velocity Errors
By simple algebraic manipulations and triangular
inequality
||s− sm||= ||(so− si)− (smo − smi )||
= ||(so− smo )+(si− smi )||
≤ ||so− smo ||+ ||si− smi ||
≤ εso + εsi.
Therefore, the relative position error is bounded
by εso + εsi.
Theorem 1 (Relative Position Error) Let so, si,
smo , smi , εso, and εsi be such that they satisfy for-
mulas (1) and (2). The relative position error is
bounded by a circle of radius
εs ≡ εso + εsi, (10)
i.e., ||s− sm|| ≤ εs. Moreover, εs > 0.
Velocity errors are given in terms of track er-
ror bounds, εαo for the ownship and εαi for the
Fig. 2 Ownship Velocity Error Bounds
intruder, and ground speed error bounds, εgo for
the ownship and εgi for the intruder. However,
as illustrated by Figure 2, velocity errors are also
bounded by a circle. In the case of the ownship,
the velocity error bound εvo is defined from εαo
and εgo as follows.
εvo ≡
√
2 ||vmo ||(||vmo ||+ εgo)(1− cosεαo)+ εgo2.
(11)
Similarly, the velocity error bound for the in-
truder εvi is defined from εαi and εgi as follows.
εvi ≡
√
2
∣∣∣∣vmi ∣∣∣∣(∣∣∣∣vmi ∣∣∣∣+ εgi)(1− cosεαi)+ εgi2.
The following lemma states that εvo and εvi
are indeed bounds on the velocity errors of the
ownship and intruder aircraft, respectively.
Lemma 3.1 Let vo, vi, vmo , vmi , εαo, εgo, εαi, and
εgi be such that they satisfy formulas (3)–(8). It
holds that
||vo−vmo ||2 ≤ ε2vo,
||vi−vmi ||2 ≤ ε2vi.
Lemma 3.1 is used to estimate the relative ve-
locity error as shown by the next theorem.
Theorem 2 (Relative Velocity Error) Let vo,
vi, vmo , vmi , εαo, εgo, εαi, and εgi be such that they
satisfy formulas (3)–(8). The relative velocity
error is bounded by a circle of radius
εv ≡ εvo + εvi, (12)
i.e., ||v−vm|| ≤ εv. Moreover εv > 0.
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Fig. 3 Cone of Possible Trajectories
In the relative coordinate system, the position
and velocity error bounds εs and εv define a cone
in the airspace that contains all possible linear
trajectories around the measured position and ve-
locity vectors sm and vm. This cone is illustrated
by Figure 3.
4 Conflict Detection and Resolution Under
Uncertainty
To accommodate for the difference between the
actual aircraft states and the measured ones,
state-based CD&R algorithms are typically used
with a protected zone extended by a safety buffer.
This section provides analytical formulas to com-
pute a safety buffer for state-based conflict de-
tection and resolution algorithms that guarantees
no missed-alerts and an actual minimum separa-
tion D.
4.1 Conflict Detection
Because of position and velocity uncertainties,
conflict?(D,T,s,v) does not necessary imply
conflict?(D,T,sm,vm). For instance, Figure 4 il-
lustrates situations where the actual position and
velocity vectors s and v may lead to a conflict,
but that conflict is not detected with the measured
state information sm and vm.
The following theorem provides the defini-
tion of a safety buffer ψ that guarantees that a
state-based conflict detection algorithm has no
missed-alerts.
Fig. 4 Missed-alerts
Theorem 3 (Conflict Detection) Let so, vo, si,
vi, smo , vmo , smi , v
m
i , εso, εsi, εαo, εgo, εαi, and εgi
be such that they satisfy formulas (1)–(8). If
cd(D+ψ,T,smo ,v
m
o ,s
m
i ,v
m
i ) = false,
then
¬conflict?(D,T,so− si,vo−vi),
where
τ≡min(T, (||s
m||+ εs)(||vm||+ εv)
(||vm||− εv)2 )
ψ≡ εs + τ εv,
and εs,εv are defined as in theorems 1 and 2, re-
spectively.
4.2 Conflict Resolution
In a similar way to conflict detection algorithms,
state-based conflict resolution algorithms that as-
sume precise aircraft state information may re-
turn resolution maneuvers that do not keep the
aircraft separated.
The conflict detection safety bufferψ can also
be used with conflict resolution algorithms to
compute resolution maneuvers that keep aircraft
separated (assuming that the resolution maneu-
vers are implemented in zero-time by the own-
ship). Indeed, let wmo be a resolution maneuver
for the ownship computed by cr, i.e.,
wmo ∈ cr(D+ψ,T,smo ,vmo ,smi ,vmi ).
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Fig. 5 Conflict Resolution Under Uncertainty
By definition of cr,
¬conflict?(D+ψ,T,smo − smi ,wmo −vmi ).
Thus, by definition of cd,
cd(D+ψ,T,smo ,w
m
o ,s
m
i ,v
m
i ) = false.
By Theorem 3,
¬conflict?(D,T,so− si,wmo −vi).
Theorem 4 (Conflict Resolution) Let so, vo, si,
vi, smo , vmo , smi , v
m
i , εso, εsi, εαo, εgo, εαi, and εgi
be such that they satisfy formulas (1)–(8). If
wmo ∈ cr(D+ψ,T,smo ,vmo ,smi ,vmi ),
then
¬conflict?(D,T,so− si,wmo −vi).
Figure 5 illustrates Theorem 4, where the rel-
ative vector wm, which denotes wmo − vmi , is as-
sumed to be tangent to the extended protected
zone.
5 Numerical Examples
Assume the following error bound values:
• εso = εsi = 10 feet.
Fig. 6 Relative Ground Speed vs. Safety Buffer
• εαo = εαi = 3 degrees.
• εgo = εgi = 5 knots.
These values are used as indicators and do not
represent actual error values of a global position-
ing system such as GPS.
Figure 6 plots relative ground speed, i.e.,
||vm|| in knots, against the corresponding safety
buffer, i.e., ψ in nautical miles, for 3 different dis-
tances d = ||sm|| between the aircraft: 10 nautical
miles, 20 nautical miles, and 30 nautical miles.
The value of ψ depends on the minimum between
the lookahead time T and the time of minimum
approach between the aircraft. When the aircraft
are far away, the value of T dominates the ex-
pression and the size of the buffer increases as
the relative ground speed increases. Eventually,
the time of minimum approach dominates the ex-
pression and from that point on the size of the
buffer decreases as the relative ground speed in-
creases.
Figure 7 and 8 use a fixed relative ground
speed of 400 knots. Figure 7 shows that the safety
buffer increases as the track error varies from 1o
to 5o, assuming that the ground speed error bound
is 5 knots. Similarly, Figure 8 shows that the
safety buffer increases as the ground speed error
varies from 1 knot to 5 knots, assuming that the
track error bound is 3 degrees. Not surprisingly,
the track error has a greater impact on the value of
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Fig. 7 Track Error vs. Safety Buffer
ψ than the ground speed error. Indeed, the track
error bound determines the span of the cone of
possible trajectories depicted in Figure 3.
6 Related Work and Conclusion
In [13], Zhao presents a semi-analytical approach
to determine appropriate separation minima be-
tween aircraft that takes into consideration wake-
vortices and flight technical errors. The paper de-
fines the uncertainty region as the difference be-
tween the measure and actual trajectories in an
interval of time. The uncertainty region is an
ellipsoid and the interval time is the maximum
between the surveillance interval and the time
needed for conflict avoidance. The paper does
not study the effect of uncertainty regions on the
conflict detection and resolution logic. In [2],
Consiglio et al. measured the impact of wind pre-
diction to determine the additional safety buffer
needed to preserve separation. The study is based
on high-fidelity simulation. Erzberger et al. [6]
propose a conflict detection algorithm that uses
stochastic analysis on predicted trajectory errors
for estimating the probability of conflict as a
function of the state information. In the context
of strategic conflict detection, Karr [9] describes
different types of prediction error and proposes
an algorithm to detect conflicts between trajecto-
Fig. 8 Ground Speed Error vs. Safety Buffer
ries that uses a notion of dynamic safety buffers.
The focus of this paper is the analytical def-
inition of a safety buffer for state-based con-
flict detection and resolution algorithms assum-
ing that the position and velocity errors are un-
known but bounded. The approach presented
here can be seen as a worst-case analysis and may
be used as a base-line for more precise calcula-
tions that take into account aircraft performance,
different type of trajectory errors, and intent in-
formation.
Last, but not least, it is emphasized that the
mathematical development presented in this pa-
per has been mechanically checked in a theo-
rem prover. Given the critical nature that CD&R
systems play in the next generation of air traffic
systems, this verification step provides additional
correctness evidence to the safety case of these
systems.
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